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R1073regulated in a cell cycle dependent
fashion by phosphorylation or by
binding of other proteins? Finally, as the
clustering region as a whole is not well
conserved, is clustering a general
feature of MKLP1 (kinesin-6) in other
organisms and, if so, how is it
controlled?
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ConsciousnessOur subjective experience of the order in which things happens feels secure to
us: C follows B follows A. This impression of order is simply that, an impression.
A recent study shows that our impressions can sometimes be illusory.Vincent Walsh
Physicists are lucky, they get to say
things like, bring us your initial
conditions (a kind of mathematical
first born) and our equations will work
forwards or backwards in time to
show that the ‘‘separation between
the past, present and the future is only
an illusion’’. Everybody nod at the
elegance. Along the way, physicists
made an important conceptual leap:
time and space are really two sides of
the same sheet. Psychologists are less
lucky, they never sound as cool as
Einstein and are only beginning to
see the connections between space
and time.
But the connection, though different
of course, is as fundamental to
cognition as it is to cosmology.
Although space and time, through no
more than historical accident, have
been studied as separate subjects in
psychology, they are inseparable in
behaviour. To shake hands, kiss,
speak, catch and even to look at
something means to get some body
part — hands, lips, eyes — to the rightplace at the right time. In real behaviour
there is no such thing as the right place
at the wrong time: a kiss becomes
a head butt, speech a mumble, a catch
becomes an empty clap and what you
were moving your eyes towards may
no longer be there.
The neural underpinnings of
cognitive space-time for action have
been set out with many predictions
[1,2] and the correspondence between
space-related and time-related
behaviours has been seen in several
different studies, some of which have
shown that our experience of temporal
order can be reversed [3–5]. As they
report in this issue of Current Biology,
Wu et al. [6] have taken a new approach
to the question of temporal perception
by using a spatial illusion called motion
induced blindness or MIB (see http://
www.michaelbach.de/ot/mot_mib/ for
a demonstration — the associated
home page really is a service to
mankind, and a crushing blow to
anyone naı¨ve enough to have
confidence in their senses). In MIB,
subjects view a simple stimulus made
up of rotating + signs. The displaycontains a circle or a number of circles
and from time to time one or more of
these disappear from your experience,
although physically they remain on the
screen.
What Wu et al. [6] did with this illusion
(do look at it — it IS an illusion) was
deceptively simple. They introduced
a flash presented inside the now
invisible circle and this flash reinstated
the perception of the circle (see their
stimuli at http://www.cerco.upstlse.fr/
wrufin/illusoryreversaldemo). The first
surprise is this: although the flash
caused the subjects to see the circle
again the subjects reported the circle
as appearing before the flash. The
second surprise is that the circle was
seen approximately 100 milliseconds
before the flash that caused it to be
seen. These two things need an
explanation.
The first thing to note is that there
have been other reports of temporal
reversals but the magnitude of the
effect is not as large as reported here.
So, are we looking at something
fundamentally new or something that
optimizes conditions for obtaining
temporal reversals? Bachmann et al.
[4], for example, reported a 30–50
milliseconds temporal reversal when
two spots differing in luminance were
presented successively, the dimmer of
the two stimuli being reported first.
Could it be that Wu et al.’s [6] invisible
circle, being suppressed, has a weaker
representation than the flash and that
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also has a weaker representation and
that this is a clue to a single
explanation? Our sensitivity to stimulus
decrements is less than our sensitivity
to stimulus increments so perhaps the
brain, given a photo finish between
a decrement and an increment
hypothesis defaults to an increment.
This isn’t a bad idea but it doesn’t
answer the question, why is the effect
as big as 100 milliseconds?
The explanation given by Wu et al. [6]
runs as follows: the ring is being
suppressed but is already represented
in the brain, whereas the flash is
a new incoming representation and
it takes time to establish a new
representation. Therefore, the time
taken to reload the old representation
of the ring into awareness is less than
the time required to upload a new
representation of the flash into
awareness even though the flash
serves to reinstate the ring. This is no
small claim. To generalize it: you should
become aware of stuff that already has
some form of representation more
quickly than new stuff presented to
you. If this is true then one suspects it
should generalize to audition, touch
and cross modal experiments. It also
presents a somewhat northern
European bus stop view of access to
consciousness taking the form of an
orderly queue in the brain, rather than
an Italian winner-takes-all bus stop
non-queue. It also raises the question
of how long a stimulus remains in the
queue — 500 milliseconds, a second,
a minute? And what of other stimuli in
different spatial locations?
My instinct at this point is with the
Italian way. We always have a weak
representation of some previously
seen stimuli — this is why priming
occurs — so should our temporal order
perception always be reversed or at
least fragile? Other factors may also be
important, such as the importance of
the stimuli, the subject’s expectations,
the history of the two stimuli (does type
A usually follow type B, for example?).
Do brain representations really queue
like the British?
A number of control experiments
were necessary. In the first, they
showed that the temporal order
reversal only occurred during the MIB
illusion. When Wu et al. [6] mimicked
the conditions of the MIB by making
the ring physically disappear there
was no temporal reversal. So, the bus
queue is only formed when a stimulusis suppressed and not when no longer
physically present. In my eyes this
means that we can make brain
representations form an orderly cue
but only under special conditions.
In the next experiment they asked
whether the 100 milliseconds
advantage for the ring is because
perception of the ring is speeded up or
the perception of the flash is slowed
down. To do this they presented two
flashes, one at the site of the
suppressed ring and one in a different
non-suppressed location in the
opposite hemifield and found that there
was no temporal delay between the two
flashes. From this Wu et al. [6] conclude
that the flash is not delayed and it is
the suppressed ring that is perceived
more quickly. This experiment contains
another interesting clue to the
explanation — the temporal reversal
may only occur in spatially overlapping
locations; it is as if the brain can form
separate, parallel queues for different
locations.
The third control experiment
established that in the illusory time
reversal you do see the ring as it was,
not as it is. Imagine you are presented
with a red circle which disappears
(the MIB illusion) and while you report
that it is not there the computer
changes the ring colour to green and
then presents you with a flash which
now makes you aware of the circle
again. The real sequence of events is,
then, RED – GREEN – FLASH – GREEN,
but subjects report RED – NOTHING –
RED – FLASH. Not only do they
report the wrong sequence of
events, they also report the circle
as being in its old colour. This is the
equivalent of allowing someone to
jump ahead of you in the bus queue
because you haven’t quite got the
right change in your hand. Again the
effect is approximately
100 milliseconds.
Wu et al. [6] conclude by suggesting
that there is a 100 milliseconds
advantage for updating
representations from pre-existing
unconscious representations. The
paper raises many questions. What is
the level in the visual system at which
these processes operate? The
explanation given by the authors
necessarily buys into a low level
explanation. The MIB phenomenon
most likely occurs due to the properties
of V1 neurons [7] and the spatial
specificity of their first control
experiment supports this (it would benice to know the spatial limits of the
effect). It is also clear that visual
awareness is dependent on recurrent
feedback to V1 [8,9] and that spatial
and temporal mechanisms for
estimation of duration and order in
vision are consistent with lower level
explanations [3,10–12].
For many people consciousness
is the holy grail of cognitive
neuroscience. These data may be
interpreted within some such
framework but they can also be seen
as simply informative about low level
spatial and temporal processing.
However, if they are to be seen in the
context of consciousness, then I would
have to contend that if visual stimuli
form an orderly queue, different queues
for different destinations and queue
according to who actually got there
first, then consciousness is clearly
a British invention.
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